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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20080772-CA

TINA HARDING,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
-kick*

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Harding's motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 45-33).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Tina Harding appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Claudia
Laycock, Fourth District Court, after the denial of her motion to suppress and her
conditional pleas to illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a convicted felon, a third degree felony.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Tina Harding was charged by criminal information filed on March 3, 2008 in
Fourth District Court with: Count 1 - possession or use of a controlled substance in a
drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-378(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10503(2)(b); Count 3 - giving false personal information to a peace officer, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-507(2); and Count 4 possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 (R. 02-01). At the preliminary hearing held on
March 19, 2008, the Court found probable cause and the charges were bound over for
trial (R. 24-22).
Harding filed a motion to suppress on April 25, 2008 alleging that while the traffic
stop was legitimate, the search exceeded the scope of the detention and was in violation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Harding's right to privacy in her personal belongings (R. 45-33). At the request of the
Court, the parties submitted briefs on the suppression issue in relation to State v. Hansen,
2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) (R. 113: 3-4). Argument on the motion was heard
on June 4, 2008 and the trial court took the matter under advisement (R. 114).
On June 12, 2008, the trial court denied Harding's motion to suppress (R. 77-68).
The court ruled that the stop had de-escalated to a consensual encounter and therefore,
the search of the vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention (R. 74-71). The court
also ruled that Harding's expectation of privacy became irrelevant because the search of
the bags was legal (R. 71). The court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the
officer to conclude that the bags were part of the consent given and that the search was
lawful (R. 70).
On June 25, 2008, Harding entered conditional pleas of guilt guilty to Count 1 illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, and Count 2 possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony (R. 84-81,
98-96).
On August 6, 2008, Harding was given suspended sentences of one to fifteen years
in prison for illegal possession or use of a controlled substance and up to five years in
prison for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, ordered to spend 166
days in the Utah County Jail with credit granted for time served, placed on probation for
36 months, and ordered to pay $15000 fine suspended to $1160, plus interest (R. 103-93).
On August 29, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth District Court
(R. 106).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1
1.

On February 22, 2008 at approximately 9:30 p.m. Officer Jeffery Westerman

initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for an inoperable plate lamp at 100 North 500 West in
Provo(R. 112:4).
2.

Westerman was told by the driver, Kimberly Stacy, that her license was suspended

(R. 112: 5). He ran a routine check and discovered that her driver's license had been
denied (R. 112:5).
3.

Westerman requested the names and dates of birth or identification from the other

three passengers in order to ascertain whether there was a licensed driver among them
who could drive the vehicle from the scene (R. 112: 5). Tina Harding was the backseat
passenger on the driver's side.
4.

None of the passengers had a valid driver's license and Harding initially gave her

name as Ruth Rascom (R. 112:6, 7). Her true identity was subsequently obtained during
the stop (R. 112:6).
5.

Westerman testified that he did not observe any signs of impairment on the driver

or the passengers (R. 112: 13).
6.

Westerman had the driver exit the vehicle, issued her a citation for the plate lamp

and for the denied driver's license, and instructed her on how to fix her driver's license

1

At a hearing on May 28, 2008 the parties stipulated to the accuracy of the facts from
Harding's suppression motion (R. 113:2). Accordingly the Statement of Facts is taken
directly from the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress (R. 45-43) with citation
also to the preliminary hearing transcript where applicable (R. 112).
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(R. 112: 7). He also told the driver that she was free to leave (R. 112: 14). At this time
the passengers were still in the vehicle (R. 112: 14, 15).
7.

The driver subsequently "came back" with another comment or question.

Westerman asked if he could look in the vehicle, and she consented (R. 112: 7-8, 14).
Westerman had already called for backup because of the "nervousness of the
passengers," and Officer Lasenby arrived to assist (R. 112: 15).
8.

Westerman then asked the passengers to "step out of the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). He

testified the passengers were free to leave. However, his statement to them was that "if
they wanted to wait with that other officer, while [he] took a look in the vehicle" (R. 112:
15). His arrest report read that he asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and "began the
consent search of the vehicle. Officer Lazenby was watching the passengers and the
driver of the vehicle" (R. 43).
9.

Westerman searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle (R. 112: 8).

Directly behind the area where Harding was seated was a small space for storage where
two backpacks were located (R. 112: 8, 16). Westerman did not ask who the bags
belonged to before he searched them (R. 112: 16).
10.

The backpacks contained items specific to Harding, including mail, photos on a

digital camera that corresponded to photos from her phone, a pink brazier, along with a
black air soft gun, a torch and torch tips, plastic baggies of assorted sizes, butane fuel,
digital scales which field tested positive for methamphetamine, a glass pipe with burnt
marijuana residue, and a spoon with methamphetamine residue (R. 112: 9-10). In
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addition, methamphetamine was found in three plastic baggies, along with lithium,
clindomycin and generic xanex pills (R. 112: 10-11).
11.

Harding was subsequently searched. A ubio sheet" was found on her person along

with a lock blade knife with a three inch blade (R. 112: 11). She was arrested and given
her Miranda warnings (R. 112: 18-19).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the denial of Harding's motion to suppress and vacate
her conditional guilty pleas because the evidence against her was obtained through an
unreasonable search and seizure of his personal property. The encounter between police,
Harding and the other occupants of the vehicle did not de-escalate to a level one
consensual encounter. The consent to search the vehicle by the driver was not valid, i.e.
it was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. Alternatively, Harding asserts
that evidence obtained from her property within the vehicle must still be suppressed
because any valid consent by the driver to the search of the vehicle did not extend to her
personal property.
ARGUMENT
I.

HARDING WAS ILLEGALLY DETAINED, AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HER PERSON AND PROPERTY
WAS ILLEGAL

Harding asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress
obtained as a result of the illegal seizure and search of her person and her property. In
the trial court, the parties stipulated: One, that the initial traffic stop was legal; and two,
6
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that Harding has standing to challenge the search because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them (R. 75-74).
The trial court denied Harding's motion to suppress, concluding that when the
vehicle owner gave consent for the search of the vehicle, the encounter had de-escalated
to a level one encounter (R. 74-71). In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650. Harding agrees with the trial court's
application of Hansen but disagrees with her conclusion. Harding asserts that the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Hansen mandates suppression in this case.
Hansen was stopped for a traffic violation and for no insurance. State v. Hansen,
2002 UT 125 at Tf 6-7. The officer obtained his license and registration and returned to
his vehicle to conduct a computer check while Hansen and his passenger remained seated
in the car. Id. at ^ 8-9. Hansen's license was valid and there were no outstanding
warrants found during the five minute check. Id. at ^f 9. As the officer returned to the
vehicle, a second officer arrived and parked alongside the patrol car. The lights on both
cars were activated throughout the remainder of the encounter. Id. at \ 10. The officer
admonished Hansen to obtain insurance and returned his license and registration. Id. at If
11-12. The officer then asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, drugs or weapons in the
vehicle. Hansen replied, "no," and the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle
even though he had no reason to suspect that Hansen was in possession of any of these
items. Id. at ^f 13. Hansen had not been told by the officer that he was free to leave after
the documents were returned, but the officer testified that in his view, Hansen was free to
leave. Id. at ^ 14. The officer testified that in asking for consent to search the vehicle, he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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used a normal tone of voice and did not make any threats. Id. The officer asked Hansen
and the passenger to exit the vehicle and stand next to the other officer. During the
search of the vehicle, the officer found a marijuana pipe on the floorboard of the driver's
area, which Hansen admitted ownership. Hansen was arrested and during a search
incident to arrest, he was found in possession of methamphetamine. Id. at f 16.
A stop of an automobile, and the detainer of its occupants, constitutes a "seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at % 28 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct.
1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). However, reasonable traffic stops are constitutional.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at If 28. The determination as to whether a traffic stop is
reasonable is a two step inquiry. First, "[w]as the police officer's action justified at its
inception?" Second, "[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). See also Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ]f 29.
Harding concedes that the traffic stop was justified at its inception due to the
observed equipment violation on the vehicle in which she was a passenger. However, she
asserts that the permissible scope of the stop was exceeded by the continued detention of
her person and the search of the vehicle. "Once the purpose of the initial stop is
concluded... person[s] must be allowed to depart. Any further temporary detention for
investigative questioning after fulfilling the purpose of the initial traffic stop constitutes
an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a
8
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further illegality." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 31 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah App. 1992)). Harding asserts that she
remained unlawfully seized after the purpose for the stop was concluded and that there
was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigative
questioning, including seeking consent to search the vehicle.
A. The Traffic Stop Did Not De-escalate to a Consensual Encounter
The trial court concluded that when the driver was returned her documents and
told she was free to leave, the encounter de-escalated from a level two investigative
detention to a level one consensual and voluntary encounter (R. 72). However, Harding
asserts that proper application of the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Hansen mandates
a different conclusion. While a "traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter when
a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or
she is free to end the encounter and depart," Harding asserts that is not the case here.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 39 (citing State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Utah
1994), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).
The trial court concluded that before asking for consent, Westerman had returned
her documents and given her a citation for the traffic violations (R. 72). However, this
was also done by the officer in Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at ^ | 11-12. This fact only
satisfies the threshold matter that a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual with return
of the documents to the driver. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 40 (quoting United States v.
Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996)). In addition, the fact that Westerman
informed the driver that she was free to leave when he gave her the citation and
9
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documents outside the vehicle is not dispositive. The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen
concluded, "[N]o single factor is dispositive, [although] factors tending to show deescalation include informing a person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to
answer additional questions. In contrast, failure to issue a warning or citation before
engaging in additional questioning weighs against de-escalation. Likewise, a coercive
show of authority, such as the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon,
physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that
compliance might be compelled, also weighs against de-escalation." Hansen, 2002 UT
125 at Tf 41 (internal quotations omitted).
In Hansen, the State argued "that none of the factors pertaining to a coercive show
of authority were present at the time of the additional questioning, and therefore, the
detention had de-escalated to a consensual encounter." 2002 UT 125 at \ 42. The Utah
Supreme Court disagreed: One, because factors demonstrating a coercive show of
authority uwere never present to begin with [and] a reasonable person would not be able
to discern that a seizure had de-escalated to a consensual encounter due to the absence of
such factors at the time of additional questioning." Id. at \ 43. Two, because at the time
of the additional questioning, "there was an arguably threatening presence of more than
one officer. As Officer Huntington walked back to Hansen's vehicle to return his
documents, another patrol car appeared on the scene. The second patrol car had its lights
flashing, and it pulled in behind Hansen's vehicle. The second officer stepped out of his
vehicle and stood next to Officer Huntington's patrol car. Only then did Officer
Huntington ask Hansen about alcohol, drugs and weapons, and request to search his
10
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vehicle. Thus, a reasonable person actually may have believed that the encounter was
escalating rather than de-escalating." Id. at ^f 44.
In this case, the facts do not establish what Westerman's demeanor was like during
the encounter here whereas in Hansen the officer testified to using a normal tone of voice
and to not making any threats. Like Hansen, Westerman was the only officer present
during the initial stop. Further like Hansen, when Westerman asked the driver for
permission to search the vehicle, another officer had arrived on the scene. During the
preliminary hearing the following exchange between defense counsel and Westerman
occurred:
Q. So after telling the driver that she could have someone come and pick up the
vehicle, you told everyone they were free to leave?
A. No, I told the driver, who was the one that was in—the other passenger was
still in the vehicle. I was speaking with the driver outside the vehicle.
Q. Okay, so when you told the driver that she was free to leave, were the
passengers free to leave?
A. At that time, yes.
Q. And that's when you asked the driver if she would allow you to search the
vehicle?
A. After she came back, once I told her that she was free to leave, she came up
with me with another comment or question, and at that time I did ask her if I
could look in the vehicle, and she gave consent.
Q. At that time were you still by yourself doing this?
11
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A. I was not. Because of the nervousness of the passengers, I had already
requested a backup unit. Officer Lasenby arrived to assist me
(R. 112: 14-15). Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Harding asserts that the facts
here—as it relates to the presence of the second officer—are exactly like that in Hansen.
In both cases only the one officer was present during the initial stop; and in both cases,
when the additional questioning was undertaken by the investigating officer, a second
officer was on the scene and present. In this case, we don't know whether the lights on
the second officer's vehicle were activated, however, Harding asserts that his simple
presence during this additional questioning is enough to cause a reasonable person to
believe "that the encounter was escalating rather than de-escalating." Hansen, 2002 UT
125 at 1f 44.
The driver here may have been issued a citation, had her documents returned, and
had been told she was free to leave. However, the passengers—including Harding, had
not been told they were free to leave, and upon returning to the officer to ask an
additional question, the driver was confronted with the presence of another officer and
was immediately asked about a search to her car, although Westerman had not observed
any signs of impairment or suspicious activity. The driver had not been told that she was
free to disregard Westerman's request. Harding asserts that a reasonable person would
not have felt free to disregard this request to search, made in the presence of a second
officer, particularly when it was night time and she was unable to drive the vehicle away
from the scene. Accordingly, while the words she was free to leave may have been
spoken, the new presence of a second officer and the almost immediate request to search
12
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(investigative questioning) upon her asking a question, would have signaled to a
reasonable person that there was no freedom to leave or disregard the officers' request.
Harding asserts that this investigative questioning by Westerman was done without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause and therefore, it was done outside the scope of the
initial, lawful traffic stop.
The trial court also concluded that Harding's argument that while the driver may
have felt free to leave before consenting to the search of the vehicle, she, as a passenger
inside the vehicle during the conversations with the driver outside, did not feel free to
leave, was "irrelevant" because "regardless of whether [Harding] felt free to leave or not,
[the] search was proper because the traffic stop had already de-escalated" and consent
had been obtained from the driver (R. 72-71). However, Harding asserts that this factor
is relevant to the continued detention of her person, and subsequent search of her person,
where a knife was discovered and she was convicted of possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person. Officer Westerman testified that he told the driver she
was free to leave, but that she was outside the vehicle and the passengers were inside the
vehicle. Furthermore, after he obtained consent to search the vehicle, he testified that his
statement to the passengers was that they were asked to "step out of the vehicle" and "if
they wanted to wait with that other officer, while [he] took a look in the vehicle" (R. 112:
15).
Under these circumstances, there was no de-escalation as it related to Harding.
She had not been told she was free to leave. She was told to exit the vehicle and wait
with the second officer. She remained detained pursuant to a level two encounter. She
13
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was not patted down for weapons, nor was there any testimony as to issues of officer
safety. The purpose of the stop had been achieved and she should have been allowed to
leave the scene while the search of the vehicle took place. Therefore, she asserts that the
subsequent search of her person was the result of an illegal detention and that all
evidence discovered as a result—including the knife found on her person—must be
suppressed. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by
the violation of a person's constitutional rights." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^f 62.
Evidence obtained from the search of Harding's person was the product of her illegal
detention and is tainted. Accordingly, it must be suppressed.
B. The Driver's Consent to Search was Not Valid
Though Harding and the other occupants of the vehicle were illegally seized,
evidence discovered during the subsequent search of the vehicle may be admitted if the
driver gave valid consent to the search. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 47. Consent is
valid if it was "given voluntarily", and was "not obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d
1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)).
"Consent is a factual finding that should be made based on the totality of the
circumstances." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 48 (citing State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107,
1108-09 (Utah 1977)). In this case, the testimony showed that the driver consented to the
search.
However, "voluntariness is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness."
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 151 (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271). Voluntariness is
14
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determined under the totality of circumstances and the State's burden of proof is by
preponderance of the evidence. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ]f 56. In other words, "[t]he
totality of circumstances must show consent was given without duress or coercion," and
courts "should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the
characteristics of the defendant." Id. at Yf 56-57 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, All
U.S. 218, 226, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Harding concedes that the
Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Hansen under very similar facts mandates a conclusion
that the driver's consent was voluntary.
Nonetheless, for the evidence obtained as a result of the search to be admissible,
the voluntary consent cannot have been obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the
violation of a person's constitutional rights." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 62 (citations
omitted). In addition, when conducting an exploitation analysis, courts must "keep in
mind [the] deterrence purpose" behind it, and "recognize [that] the need for deterrence is
strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result." Id. at \ 63
(citations omitted).
The factors that have particular relevance in an exploitation analysis are: One,
"the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct;" two, "the presence of intervening
circumstances;" and three, "the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and
consent." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 64 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brown v.
Illinois, All U.S. 590-, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)).
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First, this Court must examine the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct.
"'The purpose and flagrancy factor relates to the deterrent value of suppression.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. Where the purpose of the illegal conduct is to obtain
consent, suppressing evidence derived from the illegal conduct 'clearly will have a
deterrent effect.' Id. at 1264." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 165. In Hansen, the officer
testified that it was his practice to ask about alcohol, drugs and weapons followed up by
asking for consent to search if the vehicle occupant[s] say no. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at If
66. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that seeking consent under such circumstances
with no reasonable suspicion of further illegality "shows the purpose of the illegal
detention 'was to exploit the opportunity to ask for consent.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995)). "It also shows there was a direct
connection between Officer Huntington's misconduct and Hansen's consent." Id.
Harding asserts that the facts in this case are almost identical to those found in
Hansen. Although in this case the facts do not establish verbally what Officer
Westerman's practice was in regards for seeking consent to search vehicles, we do know
that he had no reasonable suspicion of further illegal behavior by the driver or passengers
at the time he sought consent to search. He was asked an apparently innocent question by
the driver and immediately seized upon it to request consent to search her vehicle. He
used her question to exploit an opportunity to ask for consent when he had no legal basis
for seeking such a search. Harding asserts that, like in Hansen, suppressing the evidence
derived here should have a deterrent effect. 2002 UT 125 at \ 67.

16
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Second, this Court must look at whether there were intervening factors between
Officer Westerman's misconduct in engaging in investigative questioning without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the driver's consent. "Intervening
circumstances may include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the
right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 68
(citations omitted). In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that "the record
reveals no intervening circumstances, no 'clean break in the chain of events between the
misconduct and the ... consent.'" Id. at \ 68 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274).
Accordingly, the illegality of the officer's conduct was not mitigated. Hansen, 2002 UT
125 at T| 68. In this case, like Hansen, there was no clean break in the chain of events.
Indeed, there was no break at all. It was the request to search the vehicle which was the
misconduct; and the driver was not told that she had the right to refuse consent or to
consult with an attorney.
Third, this Court must address the temporal proximity between the illegal
detention and the consent. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment Violation
and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not
had time to dissipate." Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citation omitted). See also
Hansen 2002 UT 125 at ^ 69. In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that "the
lapse of time was negligible. The illegal detention began when Officer Huntington asked
Hansen if he had any contraband in his vehicle. Directly after Hansen answered, "No,"
Officer Huntington requested and received permission to search Hansen's vehicle. Thus,
no appreciable time passed between the illegal detention and the consent that would have
17
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allowed the taint of the misconduct to dissipate." 2002 UT 125 at f 69. Harding asserts
that the same conclusion is mandated here, even more so because the illegal detention
was the request for consent to search.
Accordingly, Harding requests that this Court, like the Utah Supreme Court in
Hansen, conclude that Harding and the other occupants of the vehicle were illegally
seized at the time Officer Westerman asked the driver for consent to search the vehicle
because this investigative inquiry exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop, which had
not de-escalated to a consensual encounter because a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave and disregard the request to search under the circumstances. Harding
further asks that this Court, like in Hansen, conclude that the driver's consent was invalid
because it was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality.
C. The Search of Harding's Bags Exceeded the Scope of the Driver's Consent to
Search the Vehicle
Should this Court conclude that the traffic stop had de-escalated to a level one
consensual encounter, or that the driver's consent to search was valid, Harding still
asserts that the evidence obtained from her property within the vehicle must be
suppressed. In the trial court she argued that even if the driver's consent to search the
vehicle was valid, the scope of that consent to search did not extend to a search of her
property in the car. The trial court concluded that it was "undisputed that Ms. Harding
preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags because she never abandoned
them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate expectation of privacy
becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal" (R. 71). The
18
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trial court concluded that based upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d297 (1991), it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that the bags were part of the consent
given by the driver (R. 71-70). Harding disagrees with the trial court's conclusion and
her reading of Jimeno.
Reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. Katzv. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Consensual
searches have long been approved by U.S. courts because "it is no doubt reasonable for
the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so." Jimeno, 500 U.S.
at 250-51, 111 S.Ct. at 1803. In Jimeno police overheard the defendant arranging what
appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. The officer followed his car
and stopped him for a traffic violation (making a right turn at a red light without
stopping). 500 U.S. at 249, 111 S.Ct. at 103. The officer told the defendant he had been
stopped for committing a traffic violation. The officer went on to say that he had reason
to believe that narcotics were being carried in the car, and asked permission to search the
vehicle. The defendant indicated he had nothing to hide and consented to the search. Id.
After the occupants of the vehicle exited, the officer went to the passenger side, opened
the door, and saw a folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard. He picked up the bag,
opened it, and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. Id.
Before trial the defendant moved to suppress the cocaine on grounds that his
consent to search did not extend to the closed paper bag inside the car. Id. The United
States Supreme Court certiorari and looked at "whether it is reasonable for an officer to
19
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consider a suspect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a
paper bag lying on the floor of the car." Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. The
Court stated that, "The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object." Id.
(citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)). The
Court went on to conclude:
In this case, the terms of the search's authorization were simple. [Defendant]
granted Officer Trujillo permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit
limitation on the scope of the search. Trujillo had informed [defendant] that he
believed [defendant] was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for
narcotics in the car. We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to
conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to
search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person
may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a
container. 'Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a car.'
[Ross, 456 U.S.] at 820, 102 S.Ct. at 2170. The authorization to search in this
case, therefore, extended beyond the surfaces of the car's interior to the paper bag
lying on the car's floor.
500 U.S. at251, 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
The trial court, in reliance on Jimeno, concluded: "There is no indication in the
record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or attempted to take those bags
with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances, Officer Westerman had
no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the contents of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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vehicle. As the Supreme court explained in Jimeno, it is objectively reasonable for an
officer to search a container 'which might bear drugs.' Bags in a vehicle could certainly
contain drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively
reasonable. Thus Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to
search the vehicle" (R. 70).
Harding asserts that Jimeno does not have the controlling application to this case
that the trial court concluded it did. First, Jimeno did not address the issue of a thirdparty's consent to the warrantless search of another's property. See State v. Matejka, 2001
WI 5, ^| 18, 621 N.W.2d 891 ("The question of whether a driver's consent to the search of
a vehicle justifies the warrantless search of a passenger's belongings within the vehicle
has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court"). Moreover, passengers in
automobiles possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in their own belongings located
in a vehicle. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143
L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). Furthermore, there is a conflict between jurisdictions as to whether a
driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies a warrantless search of a passenger's
belongings. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, n.3, 621 N.W.2d 891; and State v. Frank,
650 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn. 2002) (summarizing cases on each side of the issue).
Harding asserts that the most applicable case here is that of State v. Frank, 650
N.W.2d 213 (Minn. 2002), where the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a similar
situation. In Frank, a vehicle was stopped for having only one working headlight. 650
N.W.2d at 215. There were two passengers in the vehicle, including the defendant. In
response to a question as to the group's destination, the officer became suspicious of drug
21
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activity. He gave the driver a ufix-it" ticket, separated the individuals in the car, and
questioned them further. Id. Out of appellant's hearing, the Officer asked the
owner/driver for permission to search the vehicle for "multiple things, bodies, weapons,
guns, drugs." Id. The owner/driver consented. After searching all but the area of the
backseat where the other passenger remained seated, the officer opened the trunk of the
vehicle and found two suitcases. The officer did not ask who owned the suitcases and did
not ask permission from the passengers to search the suitcases, but searched them based
on the consent of the owner/driver. Id. In one of the suitcases he found what appeared to
be controlled substances and a handgun. The officer subsequently learned that the
suitcase belonged to the defendant/appellant. Id.
In Frank, the State argued that under Jimeno, the "consent search of the suitcase
did not violate the warrant requirement because the officer had an objectively reasonable
reasonable belief that the driver's consent extended to the suitcases." 650 N.W.2d at 217.
The Minnesota court then summarized the Jimeno case, similar to what has been done
here, and stated as follows: "[T]he Court also specifically indicated that although it may
be reasonable to search a paper bag on the floor of a vehicle, it may not be reasonable to
search a locked briefcase found in the trunk of a car. [Jimeno, 500 U.S.] at 251-52, 111
S.Ct. at 1804. Each case depends on what is an objectively reasonable belief for the
officer to hold in a particular situation. Id. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04." Frank, 650
N.W.2dat217.
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The Frank court then examined cases from other jurisdictions on the in regards to
the question of whether a driver's consent to the search of a vehicle justifies the
warrantless search of a passenger's belongings inside the vehicle, and held:
We conclude that the cases holding that a driver's consent to search a motor
vehicle does not extend to property owned by passengers who are present and
available to consent to the search of their property are more consistent with
constitutional limits on warrantless searches that the cases that conclude
otherwise.
650 N.W.2d at 21849 (citing Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that driver's consent to search vehicle was not valid third-party consent
for search of items such as purses or fanny packs possessed by passengers when it is clear
that the owner of the item is present and available to consent). The court in Frank
concluded that "when a vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer has an
obligation to ascertain the ownership of items not owned by or within the control of the
consenter when the circumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner
or controls the item to be searched. Because the officer lacked consent for the search of
appellant's suitcase, the district court clearly erred by denying appellant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from his suitcase." 650 N.W.2d at 219.
Harding asks that this Court adopt the Minnesota court's ruling and rationale in
Frank. Like in that case, the driver was asked for consent to search the car outside of her
hearing. The driver was outside the vehicle while she and the other passengers remained
inside the vehicle. In both cases the search was conducted based upon the consent of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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driver. In Frank, however, the officer questioned each of the vehicle's occupants and
became suspicious of drug activity. Here, Officer Westerman had no suspicion of any
criminal activity outside of the initial traffic violation. Westerman also testified that the
bags were located in a small space for storage directly behind where Harding was sitting,
but that he did not ask who the bags belonged to before he searched them (R. 112: 8, 16).
Moreover, Westerman's only comment to the passengers including Harding was that they
should exit the vehicle and "wait with that other officer, while [he] to a look in the
vehicle" (R. 112: 15). Westerman did not explain to the driver what he wished to search
for when he obtained her consent, nor did he tell the passengers. In fact, he failed to even
mention to the passengers that he was searching the vehicle based on the driver's consent.
Harding asserts that under these facts, and based on the most applicable case from
other jurisdictions, that the trial court erred in concluding that the driver had the authority
to consent to the search of her property which was located in the vehicle.
Harding also asserts that there is another important distinction between this case
and that of Jimeno. In Jimeno, the defendant had been told that the officer suspected him
of carrying narcotics. Therefore, it was reasonable for police to conclude that the general
consent to search included consent to search containers which might bear drugs. In this
case, Officer Westerman did not tell Harding or the other passengers that he suspected
any criminal activity—such as drugs, etc. He never even informed the driver of any
suspicions. He likewise never told Harding or the other passengers that he was searching
the vehicle pursuant to the consent of the driver.
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Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that there "is no indication in the record
that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or attempted to take the bags with her
when she exited the vehicle" is irrelevant. Harding was told by the Officer to exit the
vehicle while he searched it. She wasn't told she could leave. She wasn't told that the
search was based upon the driver's consent. A reasonable person in this circumstance
would not believe that they had any right or ability to object to such a search. Instead,
she did what individuals are instructed to do: She obeyed the commands of the police.
Cf. Maletjka, 2001 WI 5 at ^f 41-42 (In applying Jimeno 's "objective test" Wisconsin
court concluded that scope of driver's consent extended to passenger's jacket where
driver had been specifically asked about drugs, guns or other contraband in the vehicle,
and where the passenger's—including the defendant—had been told that the officer had
permission from the driver to search the vehicle for contraband and they were also asked
about presence of contraband. Passenger, therefore, had been put on notice that the
search would therefore include inspection of anything capable of holding said
contraband).
Because Harding had an expectation of privacy in her bags, which had not been
abandoned, and because it was not objectively reasonable in this case for Officer
Westerman to conclude that the general consent of the driver included consent to search
her personal property, Harding urges this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her
motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse
the denial of her motion to suppress and vacate her convictions, and remand this case to
the Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9™ day of April, 2009.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
Case No. 081400645
vs.

Judge Claudia Laycock

TINA MARIE HARDING,
June 12, 2008
Defendant.
This matter came before the court for oral arguments on the defendant's Motion to
Suppress on June 4,2008, The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, Craig R.
Johnson. The defendant appeared in eustody of the Utah County Sheriff and was represented by
Barbara A* Gonzales. Having reviewed thefile,the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the
memoranda presented by both parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties* the court issues
the following:
I. PROCEDUAL HISTORY
1, On March 19,2008, during the preliminary hearing, the court bound over the defendant
for trial on 1) illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 2) possession or use of a
dangerous weapon by a resiricxd person, 3) false information io a police officer, and 4}
use or possession of drug paraphernalia.
2, The defendant filed her Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of her Motion to
Suppress on April 25,2008.
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3. On May 2,2008, the Statefiledits Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
4. On May 28,2008, the court requested additional pleadings addressing State v. Hansen, 63
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
5. The defensefiledher additional memorandum on June 2,2008 and the Statefiledits
additional memorandum on June 3,2008.
6. The court heard oral arguments on June 4,2008 and took the matter under advisement.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1 On February 22,2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for
an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m.
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman discovered that the
driver's license had been denied.
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could drive the vehicle from
the scene, Officer Westerman requested the names and dates of birth for each of the
passengers and discovered that none of the passengers had a valid license.
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an
inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license.
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the vehicle and told the
driver that she was free to leave.

2
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6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. At that point Officer
Westerman requested permission to look in the vehicle and the driver gave consent,
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman asked the driver to
search the vehicle, but was not involved in the search.
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the defendant's bags. They
were located In a storage area directly behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a
passenger in the vehicle.
9. Before searching the bags, neither Ms, Harding nor any of the other passengers Indicated
to whom the bags belonged,
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying Ms. Harding as the owner
of the bags were found in the bags during the search,
J!. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested Ms, Harding and
during the search incident to arrest, Officer Westerman found a blade knife on Ms.
Harding's person,
IL PARTIES5 STIPULATIONS
. -. The initial traffic stop was legal
13, The defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them,
TEL DISCUSSION
The parlies have stipulated to two important issues that the court would normally have to
determine in a case such as this. First, the defense acknowledged and the courtfindsthat the traffic

3
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stop conducted by Officer Westerman was justified at its inception. Second, the State has
acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the vehicle search because she had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never
abandoned them. In State v. Bagger, 76 P3d 178 (Utah App. 2003), the trial court denied the
motion to suppress because it determined that the defendant lacked standing. The Bissegger court
overturned that ruling, concluding that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her
belongings and that she never abandoned them. Unlike Bissegger, in the case before the Court
here, standing and abandonment are not disputed.
But similar to Bissegger, the Court must now determine whether the search of the vehicle
conducted by Officer Westerman was lawful. To determine this, the Court must ask three
questions. First, was Officer Westerman's action in stopping the vehicle justified at its inception?
Second, did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the detention? And third, were Ms.
Harding's bags within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle? As noted above, both parties
agree that the answer to thefirstquestion is yes: the initial stop was lawful. Thus, the court is left to
determine * heiher the search exceeded the scope of the detention and whether Ms. Harding's bags
were within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle.

A.

DID THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE
DETENTION?
In general an officer must have a warrant to search a vehicle, but one of the exceptions to

the warrant requirement is voluntary consent of the vehicle owner. See State v. Bum, 850 P.2d
1201,1217-18 (Utah 1993). Here, it is undisputed that Officer Westerman obtained the consent of
the driver before searching the vehicle. However, as seen in both Bissegger and State v. Hansen,
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of the detention. In both of those cases, the consent obtained was not valid because the traffic stop
had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter.Similarly, OfficerWestennan'ssearch of the
vehicle would be legal only if he had obtained consent after the encounter had de-escalated to a
consensual encounter.
Hansen sets out an excellent roadmap of analysis to determine whether an encounter has
de-escalated or not. The general rule is that *fca traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter
when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she
is free to. ..depart" Id at 661. As a threshold matter ua stop may not be consensual unless the
driver's documents have been returned to him/* Id. But, when the facts of a case pass this threshold
matter (as it did in Hansen and as it does in the case before the court), the court must look to other
factors to determine whether a traffic stop has de-escalated. As set out in Hansen, 'Informing a
person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions"' weighs in favor
of de-escalation. Id But a "coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one
officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone
of voice** weighs against de-escalation. Id at 662, The Hansen court explained that, under the facts
of that case, a reasonable person would not think the encounter at issue in the case had
de-escalated; in fact, a reasonable person could believe that the encounter had escalated. Id First,
the factual differences between the initial stop and the additional questioning were minimal in that
the show offorceby the questioning officer had not materially changed. Id Second, at the time of
the additional questioning, a second patrol car with its lights on arrived on the scene, which could
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have made a reasonable person believe the encounter was escalating, not de-escalating. Finally,
the officer never told the driver he was free to leave and began the additional questioning before
issuing a citation or addressing the alleged violation. Id.
Unlike Hansen, the traffic stop in this matter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter
before Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Before Asking for consent,
Officer Westerman had returned all the driver's documents and had given her a citation for the
traffic violations, indicating she was free to leave. A reasonable person would have known she was
free to leave. The second officer was already present before the driver was asked for her consent to
search the vehicle, so a reasonable person would not have thought the encounter had escalated, as
was the case in Hansen. Finally, the driver voluntarily came back to the officer with an additional
comment or question-initiating further conversation herself. It was during this conversation, not
before, that Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Unlike Hansen, a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances in this case. The court
concludes that the stop had de-escalated before consent was given and, therefore, the search of the
vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention.
The defense argues that, while the driver may have felt free to leave before consenting to
search the vehicle, Ms. Harding, as a passenger inside the vehicle during the conversations
between Officer Westerman and the driver, did not feel free to leave. The court, however, sees no
need to rule as to whether or not Ms. Harding felt free to leave because the question is irrelevant
under these circumstances. As explained in Biggegger, "a car passenger does not normally have
standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car." 76
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P,3d at 181. Nowhere in record is there any indication that Ms. Harding had either a possessory or
ownership interest in the vehicle—she was just a passenger. It is true that she has standing to
challenge the search because she owned the bags that Officer Westerman ultimately searched, but
since Officer Westerman lawfully received consent from the only person in the vehicle who had a
possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was lawful. To rule
otherwise would require an officer to gain consent from every passenger before searching a
vehicle (because each passenger may have personal belongings in the vehicle) and to individually
tell each passenger that he or she was free to leave. The case law does not support that conclusion.
Thus, regardless of whether Ms, Harding reasonably felt free to leave or not, Officer Westcrman's
search was proper because the-"traffic stop had already d^-escalated, Officer Westerman received
consent from the driver, and, therefore, the search did not exceed the scope of the detention,
B.

WERE MS, HARDING'S BAGS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO
SEARCH THE VEHICLE?
It is undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags

because she never abandoned them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate
expectation of privacy becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal
The court directs the parties5 attention to Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), In Jimem, an
officer gained consent to search a vehicle in which the driver and his wife were occupants. Id at
249-50* After the passenger s; ,

^ — • - • - * -> brown paper bag on the

passenger floorboard with cocaine inside, itf at 25a The United States Supreme Court overturned
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that a general consent to search a vehicle did not extent to a
closed bag on thefloorboard.Id. The Supreme Court explained, u p]f [the driver's] consent would
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reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no
grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." M at 252 .It further explained, "We think that
it was objectivelyreasonablefor the police to conclude that the general consent to search
respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id
at 251XlearIy,theii, the standard for deteimining whether Officer Western) an's search of the bags
was within the scope of the consent is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to
conclude that the bags were part of the consent given. The court concludes that it was.
There is no indicauon in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or
attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances,
Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the
contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme Court explained in Jimeno, it is objectionably reasonable
for an officer to search a container "which might bear drugs." Id Bags in a vehicle could certainly
contain drugs, so Officer Waterman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively reasonable.
Thus, Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to search the vehicle.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, Officer Westerman's action was justified in its inception, the search
did not exceed the scope of the detention, and Ms. Harding's bags were within the scope of the
consent given to search the vehicle. Therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress.
The State shall prepare the appropriatefindings,conclusions, and order and submit them for the
court's signature.
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DATED this f g f a a y of June, 2008.
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